At the turn of the 19th century, a question arose as to whether the Westminster Confession of Faith favoured intolerance and persecution. In 1846, the Free Church of Scotland’s response was that it did not: if fairly interpreted.
Some have considered that a bit of a stretch given that accommodation won out over toleration in the Assembly debates, and there is, for example, Samuel Rutherford’s A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience. In the Confession’s 17th century context, intolerance and persecution were within a possible and, more than likely, acceptable range of understandings. The question, then, is not whether the Confession can be understood to favour persecuting and intolerant principles, but whether that is the only way in which it can be understood. Is the wording of the WCF compatible with the claim that those who subscribe to it can hold principles consistent with liberty of conscience and the right of private judgement?
For the purpose of orientation, firstly, it should be remembered that liberty of conscience is not absolute. It is freedom from the doctrines and commandments of men, not the doctrines and commandments of God. And, while no man can read the heart, both civil and ecclesiastical government are ordinances of God for the regulation of expression and action.
Secondly, taking WCF 20:4, 30:1&2, and 31:1&3 together, and noting the American changes to WCF 20:4 and 23:3, there appears to be no objection to ecclesiastical authorities acting in the situations envisaged in WCF 20:4. It is, then, the civil magistrate’s actions which pose the difficulty here.
One approach is to wrap all the WCF’s doctrine regarding the civil magistrate together and to say that the last phrase of WCF 20:4 and WCF 23:3 only apply where and when a Christian magistrate to whom the outward peace of an established church might be safely entrusted is in power. In such a situation, the civil magistrate may lawfully act in cases where the external peace of the church is threatened; and, given that WCF 20:4 is a contained unit without the last phrase, “and by the power of the civil magistrate”, it might be said that that discretionary power is reserved even then only for exceptional circumstances when the censures of the church have proved insufficient to maintain that external peace, such as when the church is not settled or constituted in government. (See WCF 20:4, 23:3, 31:1-4, together with the explanation given the Church of Scotland’s 1647 Act Approving.)
Three points come to mind. First is that WCF 20:4 says that the civil magistrate is permitted to act in circumstances where those claiming liberty of conscience and the right of private judgement act, or incite others to act, in a manner destructive to the ordinances of God. That would cover such things as might undermine the weekly sabbath, marriage, family, work, the sanctity of life, and even government itself. Even in pluralistic societies, Christians petition the civil magistrate (WCF 31:5) to uphold biblical norms regarding the creation ordinances and the sanctity of life over-against the genuinely held beliefs of others.
Second, if the church in the WCF is thought to be the only permitted expression of any faith-group in a country, then the Standards are open to the charge of teaching intolerant and persecuting principles. If the relevant passages in the WCF refer only to the established church, and the civil magistrates’ actions are limited only to that church, denominations or faith groups could be outside of establishment yet subject to neither intolerance nor persecution. However, the established church, defined by its faith, worship, and conversation, would have a special relationship to the state. Deviation from the established church’s constitution would bring that relationship into question; and any resulting proceedings by the civil authorities would not result in criminal charges, but in civil sanctions: the loss of the benefits of the church-state connection.
Third, in those things common to human actions and societies, religious organisations are not above the law. Deciding such cases might require recourse to matters of faith, worship, or conversation.
Liberty of conscience and the right of private judgement are not separate from the uses of the moral law and the duty of the state to promote good and restrain evil. Nor is the fact that the weapons of the church’s warfare are not carnal.